Church and State: A Critical Analysis of the Lemon State by Reilly, Lawrence F.
NYLS Journal of Human Rights
Volume 6
Issue 2 Volume VI, Part Two, Spring 1989 Article 7
1989
Church and State: A Critical Analysis of the Lemon
State
Lawrence F. Reilly
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal
of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Reilly, Lawrence F. (1989) "Church and State: A Critical Analysis of the Lemon State," NYLS Journal of Human Rights: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol6/iss2/7
CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE LEMON TEST
L ImTRODUCn'oN
Few areas of constitutional analysis have presented such serious
problems of interpretation, test-formulation, and application as the
establishment clause of the first amendment.' Since its ratification
in 1791, the fruit of its varied interpretations has run the gamut
from permitting state supported churches2 to forbidding legislative
action because of a suspicion of a covert "religious purpose."3
One popular method of determining the meaning of the first
amendment is to appeal to the "Framers Original Intent." This
analysis is necessary insofar as a constitution is supposed to be a
relatively long-lasting and unchanging exposition of rights guaranteed
to a society, and therefore the original ideas set forth in a constitu-
tion should be adhered to.4 However, the "intent" of a body of
1. The first amendment reads in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
2. The establishment clause, by its language, only controlled the federal Congress. U.S.
CONSr. amend. I. The Framers recognized that the church-state issue should be left up to
the states. "Indeed, the religion clauses of the First Amendment had only a small impact on
church-state relations during the entire history of the United States prior to 1940 -since prior
to that time (as is universally acknowledged) those clauses only applied to the Federal
Government." Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective 35
EMORY L.J. 1 (1986). Consider also this statement by John Adams:
I am for the most liberal toleration of all denominations of religionists, but I hope
that Congress will never meddle with religion further than to say their own prayers,
and to fast and to give thanks once a year. Let every colony have its own religion
without molestation.
E. GREENE, RELIGION AND THE STATE 83 (1941).
For many years after the ratification of the federal Constitution and the first amendment,
many states continued support of churches. For example Massachusetts continued support
until 1833, New Hampshire until 1819. L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 81 (1986);
see also E. GREENE, supra, at 2.
3. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 43 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4. "[T]he mutability of a Constitutional principle, based on shifting political and social
judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one
generation to the next, a critical feature in its coherent interpretation." Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1977). One can imagine the problems which could arise if
no authoritative weight were given to the original intent of the Framers. The application of
the written words would become as malleable as putty in the hands of the inventive
interpreter. In George Orwell's Animal Farm, the animals' original Bill of Rights was
gradually transformed into despotism because there was nothing anchoring it to its original
intent. G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946). Of course, flexibility may be an instrument for
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
people is difficult, if not impossible, to divine. Despite this, the
history surrounding the colonization of America and the general
religious consensus held by the people at that time5 supports the
assumption that the society they constructed would have accurately
reflected their views on this sensitive issue of religious liberty.
Therefore we might understand what their goals were behind the
establishment clause by looking at the society they created.
It may be argued, however, that "original intent" is irrelevant
to today's problems and that there is no reason to submit to its
bondage any longer. This method of analysis does not use history
other than to illustrate pragmatic concerns of cause and effect.6
It does not analyze church-state questions from a philosophical point
of view (Le. what "ought" to be ) but rather from a utilitarian point
of view (Le. what effect does it have on society). This paper will
presume that deference to the original intent of the Constitution is
a prerequisite to its proper interpretation and application.
This article presents an historical outline of the relationship
between church and state in America, emphasizing the application
of the establishment clause. The analysis-will then concentrate
largely on twentieth century caselaw, culminating in the landmark
case of Lemon v. Kurtzman7 which yielded the present standard of
analysis in establishment clause cases, the "Lemon test." Attention
will be given to the theories advanced prior to Lemon and to cases
decided after it. Finally, alternative theories of analysis will be
offered.
good as well as evil.
5. "Our fathers were not only Christians; they were, even in Maryland by a vast majority,
elsewhere almost unanimously, Protestants." 1 G. BANCROFT, HISrORY OF TI-IE UNITED
STATFS 604 (1887).
6. In other words, history is studied in order to learn from experience "what is best for
society." There are two pitfalls inherent in this analysis. First, it is in constant danger of
slipping into a 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' fallacy (Le "before the fact therefore after the
fact." The fallacy lies in the assumption that, in a sequence of events where B occurs after
event A, A caused B even if, in reality, A and B are wholy unrelated.). Second, deeming
something "good" or "best" for society is a very subjective determination and subject to debate
as a separate issue. It may also beg the question of what ought to be done by the Court in
a certain case.
7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
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II. HISTORY SURROUNDING THIE Fm r AMEDmE r
"[H]aving undertaken for the glory of God and advancement of the
Christian faith, and the honor of our King and country, a voyage to
plant the fust colony in the northern parts of Viiginia. .
- The Mayflower Compact, 1620
There were three primary methods by which religious practices
were brought to the New World from Europe. First, settlers and
companies who came for a myraid or reasons brought with them the
social-religious practices of their native countries. Often, the
English government would even compel its settlers to establish
certain religious practices in their colonies to which all individuals
were obliged to submit.9 Second, religious roots were transplanted
to America by Christian sects fleeing persecution." Third, many
people came as missionaries to preach the gospel to the Indians."
Although these groups were different in their specific tenets
of belief, there existed strong common bonds between them,
including a social value system founded upon the Judeo-Christian
tradition, and more precisely, Protestant Christianity stemming from
the Reformation. 2
Many of the sects sought not only asylum in the New World,
but also to construct societies according to their beliefs. 3 Almost
8. THE MAYFLOWER COMPACr OF 1620 (quoted in F. BELLAMY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
... 5 (1942)).
9. Everson v. Board of Educ. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1946).
10. 15 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, Pilgrim, 415-16 (1965).
11. J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES Is A CHRISTIAN NATION. 16-17 (1905); C. BEARD &
M. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 10 (1947).
The first charter of Virginia, granted by King James I, in 1606 ... commenced the
grant in these words: "We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting of, their
desires for the furtherance of so noble a work, which may, by the providence of
Almighty God, here after tend to the glory of His Divine Majesty, in propagating the
Christian Religion to such people as yet live in darkness and miserable ignorance of
the true knowledge and worship of God."
J. BREWER, supra, at 13.
12. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also F. SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN
MANIFESTO 34, 37-38 (1981) (quoting Eastland, In Defense of Religious America, 71
COMMENTARY, June 1981, at 39).
13. "It is not an exaggeration to say that Christianity in some of its creeds was the
principal cause of the settlement of many of the colonies .... Beginning in this way and
under these influences it is not strange that the colonial life had an emphatic Christian tone."
J. BREWER, supra note 11, at 19-20.
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every colony either collected taxes for the support of some local
church designated by the taxpayer or had one particular church
which was preeminent and alone received government support.1
4
Even on the national level, "there was a paid chaplain in Congress
even before the Revolutionary War ended. Also we find that prior
to the founding of the National Congress all early provincial
congresses in all thirteen colonies always opened with prayer.""s It
is a mistake to assume that the religious settlers came to America
solely to avoid state-religion and thus sought vehemently to prevent
it here through the first amendment." Those who fled because of
religious persecution and oppression sought freedom of expression,
not only freedom from interference. When given the chance they
clearly and liberally expressed their beliefs through government and
law. 7 This often resulted in burdens placed on members of religious
minorities who were sometimes taxed to support the majority's
church, 8 or who, in some instances, were jailed for holding their
unpopular beliefs or expressing them through civil disobedience."
The liberal religious expression within government often led
to local persecutions or civil burdens similar to those which existed
in Europe and which caused many of the settlers to flee to
America."0  Some attempt was eventually made through state
constitutions to alleviate pressures placed on minority sects;
"Christianity" or "Protestantism," rather than a specific church, was
often declared to be the state-supported religion.' This might have
14. For an extensive discussion of this practice and each state's policy on religion see L.
LEvy, supra note 2, at 1-62.
15. F. SCHAEFFER, supra note 12, at 33.
16. Id. at 34.
17. J. BREWER, supra note 11, at 19-20; see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
18. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 2. "Massachusetts law required that a Baptist obtain a
certificate proving that he regularly attended a church of his own denomination to be exempt
from ministerial and church taxes." Id. Addressing this church attendance requirement,
Reverend Isaac Backus stated "[aill America are alarmed at the tea tax, though if they please,
they can avoid it by not buying the tea; but we have no such liberty." Id. (quoting Reverend
Isaac Backus, Petition to the General Court, Dec. 2, 1774).
19. A. HOVEY, ISAAC BACKUS 195-97 (1859); L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 2-4, 16.
20. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
21. J. BREWER, supra note 11, at 19-20. This support of Christianity was often evidenced
through religious tests for civil offices. E. GREENE, supra note 2, at 79-82. "In short, the
makers of the Revolutionary Constitutions, while promising religious liberty, did not expect
the state to be wholly neutral in matters of religion, and they usually took for granted a
consensus of opinion in support either of Protestantism or of some form of Christianity." Id.
at 82; L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 61.
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been intended to grant relief to those minorities suffering persecu-
tion or hardship at the hands of the favored church.
Although, by the letter of many of their constitutions, the states
(colonies) allowed freedom of conscience for all christians, the truth
was that hardship remained, taxes for church-support continued, and
civil restrictions were not lifted. '
These persecutions angered many colonists' and thus certainly
played a part in the construction of the first amendment. What was
to become one of the most influential opportunities to cure this ill
came in 1786 when the Virginia legislature was to vote on instituting
a "moderate tax or contribution annually for the support of the
Christian religion, or of some Christian church, denomination or
communion of Christians, or for some form of Christian worship."'24
This bill had a secular purpose, seeking public peace and morality
more so than strictly religious ends.' Nonetheless it was strongly
opposed by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.'
Madison, through a series of political maneuvers, was able to
have the vote on the bill postponed in order to explore public
opinion on this issue. He then published the famous Memorial
and Remonstrance which stated his strong position against the bill.'
Public consensus against the bill was overwhelming: over 100 letters
and petitions were received, signed by over 11,000 people; 9 out of
22. See genera//y L. LEvY, supra note 2, at 44-45 (discussing establishment of religion in
the states). It should be mentioned that there were noteable examples of religious tolerance.
These included Pennsylvania, E. GREENE, supra note 2, at 79, Rhode Island, and Delaware.
L. LEvY, supra note 2, at 25.
23. James Madison wrote in 1774:
That diabolical, Hell conceived principle of persecution rages among some ... [t]his
vexes me the most of any thing whatever. There are at this [time] in the adjacent
County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in close [ail] for publishing their
religious sentiments, which in the main are very orthodox. I have neither patience
to hear, talk, or think of any thing relative to this matter, for I have squabbled and
scolded, abused and ridiculed so long about it, [to so little] purpose, that I am
without common patience.
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 48 (R. Alley ed. 1985).
24. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 54. It has been recognized by the Supreme Court that
Jefferson's and Madision's work in this account were of utmost influence in the framing and
understanding of the religious clauses of the first amendment. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUION OF THE UNITED STATES 597 (1851).
25. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 54.
26. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
27. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 54-55.
28. Id. at 55.
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10 opposed the bill."
Madison's success and the public consensus were strong enough
to provoke the Virginia legislature to not only reject the bill but
also to enact the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty," originally
written by Thomas Jefferson.' The preamble to this bill read in
part:
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts
to influence it by temporal punishments or bur[d]ens, or by
civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy
and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the
Holy [A]uthor of our religion, who being Lord both of body
and mind, yet chose not to propogate it by coercions on
either... that to compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves,
is sinful and tyrannical ......
Whether this type of direct church support is the only type of
"establishment" the Framers wanted to prohibit by the first amend-
ment is not entirely certain. There was also a great fear that the
Anglican church, which already enjoyed great favor in many of the
states, was going to send bishops to America to exert more control
over the American churches.32 The people feared the national
government sanctioning such a plot.33
It should also be considered that the Bill of Rights was
primarily an achievement of the Anti-Federalists in their struggle
against the Federalists and the new constitution.' The primary fear
of the Anti-Federalists was encroachment of the national govern-
ment on state's and individual's rights.35 Therefore it is expected
that they would want to keep the national government from
tampering with so "local" and intimate a field as religion. Religion
29. Id.
30. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1946).
31. Id.
32. E. GREENE, supra note 2, at 73-74.
33. Id.
34. TH AN11-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSITrI~ONAL CONVENnON DEBATES 195-
96 (R. Ketcham ed. 1986)
35. Id. at 16-17.
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was to remain within the jurisdiction of the states alone.' What
they obviously did not anticipate was the massive expansion of the
federal government and the adoption of the incorporation doctrine
which has since applied the Bill of Rights to the state governments.
This means that all of the restrictions which were originally placed
only on the federal government now restrict the states as well. 7
This dramatic change in the political structure of the United States
practically undermined the Framers' original intent, and it requires
that we now interpret the establishment clause so as to affect the
Framers' and Ratifiers' original policy goals within the context of the
new constitutional framework.
This brief history provides a glimpse at what the Framers were
probably trying to accomplish by restricting the federal government's
powers with respect to religion. It should be repeated however, that
they did not seek to restrain the states' governments." "As Justice
Story wrote in 1833, in commenting on the first amendment, '[T]he
whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the
State governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense
of justice and the State constitutions."'39 Many state governments
continued in their strong religious support well into the 1800's.'
Although the Founders were probably strongly influenced by
the rationalist "Enlightenment" philosophers such as Locke and
Voltaire,4 the common people were not. This "higher learning" was
36. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
37. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (citing Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)).
38. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
39. Berman, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting J. STORY, supra note 24, at 597).
40. The Massachusetts Constitution provided for tax-supported churches until 1833, New
Hampshire until 1819. L. LEvY, supra note 2, at 38. There are numerous cases from the
1800's showing remarkable deference by state courts to overtly Christian laws and containing
statements by judges to the effect that Christianity is, in some way, a nationally established
religion. Such cases include: People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 291 (N.Y. 1811) (indictment
for blasphemy); Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. 549, 561 (N.Y. 1861) (Sunday closing law);
State v. Chandler, 1 Del (2 Harr.) 553, 555 (Del. 1837) (blasphemy); City Council v.
Benjamin, 32 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508 (S.C. 1846) (Sunday closing); Updegraph v. Common-
wealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 400 (Pa. 1824) (blasphemy); Judefind v. State, 78 Md. 405
(1894) (Sunday closing). Also note the United States Supreme Court's comment in Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1891). 'These, and many other matters
which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic
utterances that this is a Christian nation." Id. at 471.
41. M. CURTI, THE GROWrH OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 100-08 (3d ed. 1943).
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confined to universities and intellectual circles' to which the
Framers largely belonged; the people, not being privy to this type of
education, remained largely unaffected creating a dichotomy in
society." Generally, the attitude of the 'Enlightenment Thinkers'
toward religion was "tolerance". This slowly spreading philosophy,"
along with the gradually shrinking involvement of government with
religion, meant increasing amounts of freedom for people in
religious minorities. This air of tolerance led one contemporary to
write, "As Christians, religion curbs them not in their opinions, the
general indulgence leaves everyone to think for themselves in
spiritual matters; the laws inspect our actions, our thoughts are left
to God."45 It was this liberal yet still strongly Christian climate that
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote about in Democracy in America.' "It
seemed to him that the American people were, in spite of the
multiplicity of sects among them, agreed in thinking religion, and
especially Christian morality, essential to the maintainence of a
democracy."4  It is important to recognize that although some of
the Framers probably believed in the Enlightenment's idea of
tolerance and liberty, they hoped that the people would not stray
from the tenets of their faith. The continuing strength of their faith
would allow social morals to be maintained without government
action."
It was not until the early 1900's that drastic social changes
occurred in America, not the least of these changes being the
metamorphosis of peoples' basic philosophies. Darwininsm and the
Industrial Revolution had swept upon the shores of America and
begun to replace older religious values with more utilitarian, secular-
42. Id. at 107-08.
43. Id.; T. DYE & L. ZEIGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY 25 (6th ed. 1984).
44. This was gradually disseminated to the common people through mediums such as
newspapers and university-schooled preachers. M. CURTI, supra note 41, at 101-05.
45. F. BELLAMY, supra note 8, at 93.
46. A. TOCOUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (H. Reeve trans. 1961) (quoted in E.
GREENE, supra note 2, at 100).
47. E. GREENE, supra note 2, at 100.
48. It is even contended that some of the intellectual elite wished to maintain the strength
of religion amongst the populace because it was a useful social tool for keeping the people
under control and maintaining a high level of morality. According to this strategy religion
is not protected as legitimate in its own right but rather as a means of controlling the masses.
M. CURTI, supra note 41, at 107-08.
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political concepts. 9 In addition, this period witnessed a great influx
of immigrants to America who differed in their ethics, religious
practices, beliefs, and lifestyles the from earlier western European
settlers." America's social cross-section became dramatically
different from anything the Founders had witnessed. The phrase
'freedom of religion' would now have to take on a new form.
Previously it had meant, for the most part, 'freedom within chris-
tianity', and, while the Framers might have meant freedom to all
religions,51 they did so mostly in theory, not practice. The influx of
"foreign religions" and the changes in social philosophy would mean
a reworking of the relationship between church and state in
America. In 1946, the establishment clause was made applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment.52 This radically
changed church-state jurisprudence throughout America and
provided an increase in the number of cases on this issue.
The question to be answered by the Court in the Twentieth
Century is: exactly how much interaction may the government have
with religion? It is the difficulty in drawing this line that has caused
problems and irregularities in church-state cases.
IL 20th CEiniy CASES
A. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing (1946).
In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing,53 the Supreme
Court faced the question of whether a state stautute which provided
reimbursement of bus fare to parents who sent their children to
either public or Catholic schools was unconstitutional." The
plaintiff's case rested on two major points of law. First, the statute
taxed the private property of some in order to bestow it upon
others for their personal use and thus violates the due process
49. Eastland, supra, note 12, at 42-43.
50. E. GREENE, supra note 2, at 102-03.
51. J. WHrrEHEAD, SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUtnON 97-98 (1982) (quoting . STORY, supra
note 24, at 593-95).
52. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (citing Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)).
53. Id. at 1.
54. Id. at 3.
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clause of the fourteenth amendment.55 Second, the statute violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment by forcing citizens
"to pay taxes to help support and maintain schools which are
dedicated to, and which regularly teach, the Catholic faith."'56
The majority opinion, written by Justice Black, held that the
New Jersey statute did not violate the Constitution under either
amendment." On the first issue, Justice Black accepted the
argument that the statute facilitated a valid state interest, i.e. the
education of all children." He argued that "[tihe fact that a state
law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal
desires of the individuals most directly affected is certainly an
inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously
appraised the public need."59
On the second issue the Court held that the first amendment
did not proscribe the state action in question.' Justice Black
reviewed the history of the first amendment, drawing attention to
the specific evil that the Framers sought to remedy: overt state-
sanctioning of the beliefs of one sect.6" This evil, he concluded, was
not present in this case.62 He compared the New Jersey statute to
the state's provisions of police, fire, sewer, and roadway services to
religious institutions, denial of which is "not the purpose of the first
amendment."' Instead, the proper state posture should be one of
neutrality "in its relations with groups of religious believers and
nonbelievers; it does not require the states to be their adversary.""
Justice Black stated a vague test:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the first amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
55. Id. at 5. 'This is said to violate the due process clause because the children are sent
to these church schools to satisfy the personal desires of their parents, rather that in the
public's interest in the general education of all children." Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 6-8, 17-18.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 17.
61. Id. at 8-16.
62. Id. at 17-18.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 18.
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which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church atten-
dance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and state."'
Justice Jackson dissented (with Justice Frankfurter joining)" on
the principle that Catholic schools are the heart of the Catholic
church and, therefore, any support to those schools is governmental
support of the Catholic church. 7
He further argued that this Act was not aimed at a legitimate
state interest: "The resolution which authorizes disbursement of this
taxpayer's money limits reimbursement to those who attend public
schools and Catholic schools ... The New Jersey Act in question
makes the character of the school, not the needs of the children,
determine the eligibility of parents to reimbursement."' Justice
Jackson found the analogy to police, fire, and other public services
faulty because the Act uses a religious test to determine those who
will receive aid.' Finally, he determined that the first amendment
was intended to deny any religious sect control over public policy
and taxes as well as to remove "religious contentions" from the
political forum.7"
65. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
66. Id. at 18-28 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 24.
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id. at 26-27.
It was intended not only to keep the state's hands out of religion, but to keep
religion's hands off the state, and, above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out
1989]
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Justice Rutledge also dissented (joined by Justices Frankfurter,
Jackson, and Burton)71 and argued for a much more draconian
separation policy. Rutledge contended that the first amendment
was designed to "create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion."'
Even though the burden imposed by the tax was minimal,'
Justice Rutledge argues that it is a "slippery slope".74 Once the door
is opened, and such acts are condoned as "legitimate state interests,"
then it follows that complete subsidization of parochial schools is
also justified.75
All three opinions claim to apply the Framer's original intent
in drafting the first amendment. The majority opinion accepted the
validity of the Act because: 1) it was deemed to further a legitimate
state interest; and, 2) it was found not to be the type of activity
which would have been prohibited by the Framers.76 The two
dissenting Justices saw the New Jersey Act as a clear violation of
the establishment clause, even though the burden imposed was
relatively light; the violation was one of type, the degree of violation
being irrelevant."
B. Zorach v. Clauson (1952)
The application of the first amendment to state involvement
of public life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control
of public policy or the public purse.
Id. at 27.
71. Id. at 28-74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 31-32.
73. Id. at 18-19 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson comments that the insignificance
of the cost at first persuaded him that the tax was innocuous. Id. But further reflection
revealed that it was still violative of historical separation principles. Id. at 19. He further
concluded that it might even lead to government regulation in religious matters. Id. at 27.
"The only line that can be so drawn is one between more dollars and less. Certainly in this
realm such a line can be no valid Constitutional measure." Id. at 48-49 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
74. Id. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). A "slippery slope" is a condition such that
movement in the suggested direction would lead to ever increasing movement in that
direction, just as placing one on a slippery hill would naturally cause a slide downhill.
75. Id. at 48.
76. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
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in public schools was expanded in the case of Zorach v. Clauson.
The case involved a "released time" program in which students in
public schools would be released during school hours to receive
religious instructions. 9 The program was paid for by private funds
and was conducted off school grounds.' Appellants contended that
this case was substantially similar to McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion"1 and represented the state placing its "weight and influence"
behind certain religious instruction.'
The court, citing Everson, reaffirmed that the separation
between church and state must be "absolute" within the scope of the
first amendment, permitting no exceptions.' "The first amendment
however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
a separation of church and state."'
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, argued that Ameri-
cans are, historically, a religious people, and it is in best keeping
with that heritage for the government to cooperate with religious
activities. ' Similar to Justice Black's test in Everson, Douglas' test
for a violation of the establishment clause is vague. It does
however require a finding of coercion or the affirmative sanctioning
of one religious sect over another.8' To Justice Douglas, a reading
of the first amendment that would prohibit this infringement on
school schedules would represent an unconstitutional governmental
postion demonstrating "callous indifference to religious groups".'
78. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1951).
79. Id. at 308.
80. Id. at 308-09. This is unlike McCollum, where the release-time program and religious
instruction were conducted in classrooms and was therefore deemed unconstitutional.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). "Designed to serve as perhaps the most
powerful agency for promoting cohesion ... the public school must keep scrupulously free
from entanglement in the strife of sects." Id. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
81. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 309; McCollum, 333 U.S. at 203. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
82. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 309.
83. Id. at 312.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 313-14.
86. Id. at 314. "Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious
instruction ... nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person..
. [t]he government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects ... it may
not thrust any sect on any person ... [or] make religious observance compulsory . . ." Id.
87. Id.
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Justice Black dissented' arguing that the distinction between
the facts of this case and McCollum are immaterial." The state is
still providing religious groups aid when it allows them to capitalize
on compulsory school attendance rules.' The real issue was not
whether the state's intrusion into religious activities, either sanction-
ing or hindering, had been impermissively deep, but, whether it had
entered this field at all.9 Notice that Justice Black had also written
the majority opinion in Everson wherein he found the reimburse-
ment program to be aid to the children, not the schools, and
therefore not violative of the establishment clause.'
Justice Jackson also dissented" calling the statute an exercise
of state "coercion"' which effectively jailed students who did not
wish to go to religious instruction . He argues that this decision is
heavily biased against "irreligion" (Le. nonreligion) and thus presents
a substantial threat to freedom of religious practices in the future.'
His analysis entails a very strict reading of the establishment clause
allowing no religious influences on government. However, he did
not explore the possibility of establishing "irreligion" by making the
government totally free from religion and promoting secularism.97
C. Board of Education v. Allen (1967)
The opinion in Board of Education v. Allen," written by Justice
White, upheld a New York statute which required school authorities
to loan textbooks free of charge to all students (not schools)
between grades seven and twelve, including students in private
88. Id. at 315-20 (Black, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 316.
90. Id. at 316-17.
91. Id. at 318.
92. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1946).
93. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 323-25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 323.
95. Id. at 324.
96. Id. at 325. "'he day that this country ceases to be free for irreligion it will cease to be
free for religion - except for the sect that can win political power." Id.
97. This is the type of establishment many religious people complain of today. Irreligion
in government does not simply imply a lack of traditional "religion" but rather its replacement
by a different philosophy, sometimes called "humanism" or "secular humanism" which makes
man the ultimate judge of right and wrong instead of God.
98. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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schools." The school boards had sought judicial relief claiming that
the statute was violative of the establishment clause and the
fourteenth amendment.1"
The New York Court of Appeals held, and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed, that the statute had a legitimate secular purpose:
"to benefit all school children, regardless of the type of school they
attend . . . . ,"' There was an additional safeguard to the Act's
religious neutrality in that only textbooks approved by the public
school authorities could be loaned."l This precluded the possibility
of state funds going directly for a religious purpose; only secular
books could receive approval.1"3
Quoting from Abington School District v. Schempp, ° the Court
applied a two-prong test for establishment clause questions: "[W]hat
are the (1) purpose and (2) the primary effect of the enactment?
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed
by the Constitution."'" This test had been subscribed to by eight
Justices in the Schempp case" and therefore represented the
development of a standard test which could be used by the courts.
Applying this test to the express language of the 'statute, the
Court found that its stated purpose was the furtherance of educa-
tional opportunities; therefore, the statute was deemed constitution-
al.1"7 By this holding, the Court showed great deference to the
school board's discretion and integrity in carrying out the secular
purpose of this Act.
In a concurring opinion,"° Justice Harlan agreed with the use
of the two-prong test of Schempp and also offered an analysis of his
own.
[W]here the contested governmental activity is calculated to
99. Id.
100. Id. at 238.
101. Id. at 241.
102. Id. at 244-45.
103. Id. at 245.
104. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
105. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id at 249-50 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the com-
petence of the State, and where the activity does not involve
the State "so significantly and directly in the realm of the
sectarian as to give rise to .. . divisive influences and
inhibitions of freedom", it is not forbidden by the religious
clauses of the [first] amendment.' 9
Justice Black dissented110 and accused the Court of breaching
the wall of separation between church and state."' He rigorously
distinguished his majority opinion in Everson in which parents whose
children were bused to parochial schools received reimbursement
from state tax revenues; Everson had merely provided public
transportation service whereas this statute supplied books, "which
are the heart of any school."' . The evil was one of degree; in
Justice Black's opinion the facts in Everson did not cross the line
of separation while the facts of this case did. However, it is difficult
to see any meaningful distinction between busing and books with
regard to the establishment clause. Justice Black held in Everson
that the state practice was legitimate because it helped children
regardless of their religion and aided the children, not the schools.'13
Why the same argument doesn't apply to lending school books is
not clear.
Justice Douglas filed a lengthy dissent1 in which he argued
that unlike providing busing, a public nurse, or scholarships, buying
textbooks is impermissible state aid to religion: "The textbook goes
to the very heart of education in a parochial school. It is the chief,
although not solitary, instrumentality for propagating a particular
religious creed of faith." 115 Furthermore, he saw a dichotomy evident
in textbooks, that is, some presented history, science, math, and
economics from a "christian" point of view while others had a
109. Id. (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 307).
110. Id. at 250-54 (Black, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 250-51.
112. Id. at 253.
113. Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 6 (1946).
114. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254-69 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 257. Justice Douglas also points out that the school directors have significant
latitude in choosing which textbooks will be ordered and thus are able to facilitate the
greatest possible aid to their religious cause. Id. at 255-56.
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'secular' perspective. " " This, he argued, enhanced the possibility
that state support would be used to further religious interests by
parochial school masters selecting books which supported their own
beliefs. "7 The statute in question, because of the discretionary
power given to school directors, provides the possibility of the state
eventually dominating the church."' None of the dissenting opinions
discussed or utilized the two-prong test stated in the majority
opinion; they merely found the state program to be too supportive
of religious ends.
D. Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York (1969)
The issue in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York" 9
was whether the historic practice of granting religious organizations
tax exemption for properties used solely for religious worship
violated the establishment clause.1"° The plaintiff argued that the tax-
exemptions are an indirect form of state-subsidy of a religion."'
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, first
stated the general principle that had been used since Everson: that
the first amendment does not permit either a government-establish-
ed religion or government hostility towards religion." "Each value
judgement under the Religion Clauses must therefore turn on
whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or
interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of
doing so."'"'
Chief Justice Burger argued that the very existence of religion
meant that there would be some degree of involvement between it
and government. 4 Therefore, the religious clauses were instituted
to prevent "excessive entanglement" of the two."' He then found
116. Id. at 256-62.
117. Id. at 256.
118. Id. at 262.
119. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
120. Id. at 666.
121. Id. at 667.
122. Id. at 669.
123. Id. (emphasis added). These rules embody both the general principles propagated by
the Court since Everson and the newer 2-prong test brought out in Allen and Schempp. See
supra notes 92, 104-05 and accompanying text.
124. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
125. Id. at 674.
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that tax-exemption for churches is neither the advancement nor the
inhibition of religion, rather, it is merely the recognition of a
historical practice."
Thus, the Court now requires legislation to not only pass the
"purpose" and "effect" tests of Allen, but also its new "entanglement"
test:27 "We must also be sure that the end result - the effect - is not
an excessive government entanglement with religion . . . [and that
the involvement] is a continuing one calling for official and continu-
ing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entangle-
ment."" Using this test, the Court found that taxing the churches
would involve a greater degree of entanglement than leaving them
tax-exempt. The Chief Justice also anticipated Justice Douglas'
fears that allowing any breach in the wall or separation would
eventually cause a flood: "If tax exemption can be seen as this first
step toward 'establishment" of religion . . . [then] the second step
has been long in coming."1
9
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion 3 stated a different test,
taken from his opinion in Schempp.3 Under this test the establish-
ment clause forbade those involvements of religious with secular
institutions which "(a) serve the essentially religious activities of
religious institution; (b) employ the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means
to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice."'
Like the majority, Justice Brennan felt that the history of the
establishment clause and the history of the practice in question were
persuasive and that the Framers were not trying to halt church-
government interactions such as this.'33 He also found two secular
justifications for such a practice.
First, these organizations . . . contribute to the well-being
of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways and
126. Id. at 666-67.
127. Id. at 674.
128. Id. at 674-75.
129. Id. at 679.
130. Id. at 680-94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
131. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
132. Walz, 397 U.S. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294,
295).
133. Id. at 694-95.
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thereby bear burdens that would otherwise have to be met
by general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of
the community.1" Second, the government grants exemp-
tions to religious organizations because they uniquely
contribute to the pluralism of American society by their
religious activities."5
Justice Harlan also concurred," but he cited a slightly different
analysis than that used by the Court. His test set forth three
standards which should be achieved in establishment clause analysis:
neutrality, voluntarism, and unity.3 7  Under Harlan's analysis,
neutrality means the state may not favor any religion or nonreligion
over another, voluntarism means the state may not compel religious
practices nor work to deter them, and unity means "political
fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded against."" Against
the challenge that allowing such legislation "opens the gates to a
flood of evil" (ie., the slippery-slope problem) Harlan stated, "I, for
one, however, do not believe that a "slippery-slope" is necessarily
without a constitutional toehold."139
Justice Douglas again dissented,1" framing the issue as whether
"organized believers" should be allowed the tax benefit while
nonbelievers, whether organized or not, must pay the tax. 41 To
Justice Douglas, if the legislation prefers believers over nonbelievers,
it is unconstitutional. 42 He also argued that the tax-exemption is, de
facto, a form of government subsidy and is therefore void under the
establishment clause.
143
The opinions of Justice Douglas and that of the majority show
a clear dichotomy in establishment clause interpretation. The
majority argues that some minimal interaction between church and
134. Id. at 687. This runs afoul of the distasteful situations described earlier. See supra
note 48 and accompanying text. See also M. CURI, supra note 41, at 107.
135. Walz, 397 U.S. at 689.
136. Id. at 694-700 (Harlan, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 694-95.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 699-700.
140. Id. at 700-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 701.
143. Id. A similar argument may be found in E. GREENE, supra note 2, at 97.
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state is permissible, indeed inevitable.'" Justice Douglas' opinion in
this case and in Allen argues for a complete sterilization of govern-
ment from religion. 45
E. Lemon v. Kurtzman (1970)
Lemon v. Kurtzman"4 involved a Pennsylvania statute1 4 which
reimbursed nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
teaching materials." The reimbursement was limited to specific
nonreligious courses and could not be used in any context that
would "express religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship
of any sect. 1 49 Most of the eligible schools were affiliated with the
Roman Catholic Church.5°
The case was combined for consideration with Earley et al. v.
DiCenso et al., and Robinson, Commissioner of Education of Rhode
Island et al. v. DiCenso et al. "I These cases dealt with a Rhode
Island statute'53 which provided a salary supplement for teachers in
nonpublic schools in which the average expenditure per student on
secular education was below that in a public school. 54 The supple-
ment was limited insofar as it could not make the nonpublic school
teacher's salary greater than a public school teacher's.'55  All
teachers receiving this supplement were required to agree not to
teach any courses in religion. 5' Once again, the largest benefactors
were the Roman Catholic schools. 5 '
144. See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 114-18, 140-43 and accompanying text.
146. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
147. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Purdon 1970).
148. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609.
149. Id. at 609-10. "It is further limited 'solely' to courses in the following 'secular'
subjects: mathematics, modem foreign languages, physical science, and physical education."
Id. at 610.
150. Id.
151. DiCenso v. Early, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
152. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
153. Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, R.I. GEN. IAws §§ 16.51.1 - 16.51.9 (Supp.
1970).
154. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1970).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 608.
157. Id.
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The stated legislative purposes of these Acts were similar; the
legislatures found a crisis in that, due to rising costs and other
factors, the quality of education being offered in the nonpublic
schools was in jeopardy."8 These schools needed financial aid to
attract able teachers and provide an adequate education for their
students. 59 The states responded with the statutes in question, and,
to avoid giving impermissible aid to a set of religious beliefs, set up
many safeguards to ensure that the money would be used to further
the state interest of education, not any church's interest in religious
instruction."W
The legal analysis in the opinion written, by Chief Justice
Burger begins with an acknowledgement that the Everson decision
represented the extreme of permissible government aid to religion.16'
He then capsulized the main tests used in earlier Supreme Court
decisions and stated what is now the three-prong "Lemon test.""
Citing Allen, Chief Justice Burger stated that "(1) the statute must
have a secular purpose, and, (2) its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion."" Then, citing
Walz, he added that "(3) the statute must not foster an excessive
governmental entanglement with religion.""
Applying this test to the facts of the immediate case, the Court
showed deference to the stated purpose of the Act and thus
satisfied the first prong, legislative purpose.'" The Court then
applied the second prong, primary impact, and found an imminent
potential for violation.'" Then, in a curious twist, the Court
abandoned this reasoning. It found that the very safeguards
designed to protect against a violation of the second prong con-
stituted a violation of the third prong - "the cumulative impact of
the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each state
158. Id. at 607, 609.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 607-10.
161. Id. at 612.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
164. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
165. Id. at 613.
166. Id.
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involves excessive entanglement between government and religion." '67
Chief Justice Burger provided an analysis to be used to
determine whether a statute violates this ambiguous third prong,
excessive entanglement "[W]e must examine the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the
aid that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between
the government and the religious authority."'t
The district court had found that the mostly Catholic schools
were an integral part of the Catholic Church and, because of their
strong religious influence, the state was obliged to provide substan-
tial safeguards to ensure that the state aid only be used for secular
education.1 9 However, in the Supreme Court this proved to be a
problem for the statutes because there was an inherent danger in
supplying teachers (or their salaries) as opposed to supplying
inanimate aids such as books or transportation. 7 ° The inherent
danger was that a teacher, in such an atmosphere, may be prone to
influence students toward his or her religious beliefs and was
therefore not as easily monitored as a textbook would be. 7' There
were no allegations that this harm had actually been realized, but
the Court was anticipating the potential harm it threatened."7
Chief Justice Burger next presented a different concern of the
third prong, that being the avoidance of political division along
religious lines. "Ordinarily political debate and division, however
vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of
our democratic system of government, but political division, along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First
Amendment was intended to protect."73
Finally, the Court distinguished Walz by the fact that there is
not a history of state-aid to church schools. 74 If Everson, as the
Court stated, represented the outer limit of permissible government-
167. Id. at 614. 'These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring
entanglement between state and church." Id. at 619.
168. Id. at 615.
169. Id. at 616.
170. Id. at 617.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 618.
173. Id. at 622. (citing Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680,
1692 (1969)).
174. Id. at 624.
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aid to religion, then the statutes in this case could not be allowed
to stand since they represented a significant step beyond the limit
set by Everson.7 ' As was stated by Justice Douglas in Zorach, "The
problem like many problems in constitutional law, is one of de-
gree.""76
IX. SiNcE LEAoN / ALTERNATIVES
The results of cases applying the Lemon test have been
confused enough to destroy any predictability that might have flowed
from a standard test.'" Cases involving: public school teachers used
in remedial and supplemental programs in parochial schools,"m the
state loaning textbooks and other educational services to parochial
schools, 79 a "shared time" program where public school teachers
supplement nonpublic school curricula,' and a state statute requir-
ing balanced classroom teaching of evolution and creation-science 8'
have all been declared unconstitutional. Regardless of the merits of
these decisions they are inconsistent with the following practices
declared constitutional under the same test: a city sponsoring a
creche display at Christmas,18 a state legislature opening each
session with prayer led by a chaplain paid with state funds," and a
tax-credit given to parents of children attending non-public (inclu-
ding parochial) schools."8
The following is a discussion of possible alternatives to the
present church-state analysis. These are being explored because, it
is argued, the Lemon test has produced inconsistent and unsatisfac-
tory results. Either a different test is needed to yield more consis-
tent results, or the goals of society with respect to church-state
relations need to be clarified so that the Lemon test may be used
evenly and satisfactorily to achieve these goals.
175. Id.
176. Zorach v Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1951).
177. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
178. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
179. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
180. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
181. Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
182. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
183. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1982).
184. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1982).
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In Allen, Justice Harlan stated an alternative test.1' He
affirmed the general proposition set forth by Justice Goldberg in his
concurring opinion in Schempp that "government neither engage in
nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among
sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deter-
rence of no religious beliefs."'" To apply this Justice Harlan says:
I would hold that where the contested governmental activity
is calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise
within the competence of the State, and where the activity
does not involve the State so significantly and directly in the
realm of the secretarian as to give rise to .. . divisive
influences and inhibitions of freedom, it is not forbidden by
the religious clauses of the First Amendment.187
This analysis would likely allow more state actions than are
permitted under Lemon. The test was explained further in Walz
where Justice Harlan gave three points to be satisfied in establish-
ment clause analysis: voluntarism, neutrality, and unity.', With
regard to the first two he quotes Justice Goldberg.1  The third
prong, hinted at in the Justice Goldberg quote ("divisive influences"),
is restated as a concern that the Court guard against "political
fragmentation on sectarian lines."'" Harlan asserted that "[w]hat is
at stake as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of
governmental involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us,
is apt to lead to strife and frequently strains a political system to the
breaking point."'9t
Although by looking only for some "impermissible degree" this
third prong seems to allow liberal interaction between religion and
government, it is an extremely vague standard that really only
restates the essential problem in establishment clause analysis, that
is, what is permissible? The Court conceded in Walz that an
185. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
186. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1962) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
187. Id.
188. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694-95 (1969).
189. See supra notes 109, 185 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
191. Walz, 397 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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absolute separation is impossible and stated that the Court's task is
to find the boundaries that mark excessive entanglement.1"
A much clearer test is suggested by Justice Black's opinions in
Everson and Zorach.'93 This analysis looks for any indication of
coercion by the government in favor of religion.1" Once coercion
is found, regardless of degree, the government is in violation of the
establishment clause:
Any use of such coercive power by the state to help or
hinder some religious sects or to prefer all religious sects
over nonbelievers or vice versa" is exactly what I think the
First Amendment forbids. In considering whether a state
has entered this forbidden field the question is not whether
it has entered too deep but whether it has entered at all."9
The coercion Justice Black found in Zorach was allowing
students to take school time off so they might attend religious
instruction classes.1" The majority opinion found no such coercion
and, to the contrary, found the schools to be passive and merely
cooperative with the actions of those who wished to attend the
religious classes.1" Although requiring a finding of coercion would
seem to provide a large degree of predictability for states, it is still
subject to the discretion of the courts. This discretion can lead to
results contrary to what one might reasonably expect the Court to
reach. Such was the result reached by Justice Black in the Zorach
case. It is precisely this lack of predictability that is a cause of
concern in the Lemon test.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the results of establishment
clause questions should not be as harsh as they have been."' His
position is that the Framers merely meant to avoid the installation
of a national church, similar to the condition in England at that
192. Id. at 670.
193. See supra notes 57-65, 88-92 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 57-65, 88-92 and accompanying text.
195. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). See also United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
196. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 316 (Black, J., dissenting)
197. Id. at 311.
198. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
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time, or from discriminating between religious sects.'"
The Court apparently believes that the Establishment Clause
... not only mandates religious neutrality on the part of
government but also requires that this Court go further and
throw its weight on the side of those who believe that our
society as a whole should be a purely secular one. Nothing
in the First Amendment or in the cases interpreting it
requires such an extreme approach to this difficult question
20
It is the thesis of this article that the consistency problem
should not be resolved by sterilization"0' but rather by acceptance of
the historical fact that the United States was, in some sense, a
christian nation. As was said by the Supreme Court in 1891,
"[t]hese, and many other matters which might be noticed, add a
volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances
that this is a Christian nation."'
The Framer's intent in creating the establishment clause was
at least this: to avoid a theocracy or a theocratic dictatorship. But
they were not advocating a total separation of religion from
government.2 3 Civil law must control the exercise of religion and
other liberties to some degree in order to maintain social order,'
but these constraints should be narrowly tailored. The question
199. Note, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need to Reform Establishment Clause Analysis, 35
CATH. U.L. REV. 573, 586 (1986) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2520 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
200. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
201. Justice Douglas' position would have been to declare all of the state actions listed at
the beginning of this section unconstitutional. That would certainly deal with the problem of
inconsistency.
202. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1891). The words of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court written in Updegraph v. Commonwealth are helpful when defining
what a "christian state" is: "not Christianity with an established church, and tithes, and
spiritual courts; but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men." Updegraph v.
Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 400 (Pa. 1824). I contend that this is closer to the
Framer's original intent than present ideas held by the Court and thus is an historically
sound ideal for America.
203. The fact that they wanted to separate government from church activities and
maintainence is plain, however, as is evident in their writings, government should be
influenced by "religion" to the betterment of society. See supra notes 17, 48 and accompany-
ing text.
204. For example, to prevent human sacrifices.
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then faced is: what is the source of these rules that will control the
freedoms allowed in America including the free exercise of religion?
Historically, the answer was social ethics based on the Judeo-
Christian ideas of morality.' ° However there has been a growing
trend, fueled by the secularization of society and now in full force,
to analyse and legitimize social policies solely on a utilitarian
standard.'
The first implication of this development is that there is no
longer any recognizable body of morals that controls society, because
there is no body of morals that society has agreed to accept. A
second possible implication is that the legitimacy of religion and
religious freedoms will become degraded and disrespected. A
dangerous sign of this trend is when religious practices need to be
legitimized by the courts according to a utilitarian amount of good
works they carry out for society.2 °7
The Founders were primarily interested in maintaining the right
to free exercise of religion and through the establishment clause
they hoped to insure that the government would not impinge upon
this (especially by establishing a national religion). This does not
mean that religious influences are to be kept away from the
government.' On the contrary, the religious mores that were so
strong in America's Revolutionary society were the very source of
social order.'
The establishment clause gives no bright-line test by which it
is to be applied, and therefore is subject to reinterpretation
generation after generation. To the Founders and then predomi-
nantly christian population, society should remain tightly connected
to religion, specifically protestant christianity. An analysis of the
society created by the Founders historically supports the proposition
that there should be a christian foundation in our present society as
well as a recognized christian influence in our courts and legisla-
tures. The "Framer's Original Intent" argument then is applicable
205. J. BREWER, supra note 11, at 15, 19-20.
206. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
207. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 687-89 (1969) (Brennan J.,
concurring). This type of analysis can pose a serious threat to religious freedom if it is
pursued by the Court. Chief Justice Burger recognized this and avoided it. Id. at 674.
208. As apparently is argued by Justice Douglas in Allen and Walk. See supra notes 114-
18, 140-43 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 13, 17, 48 and accompanying text.
1989]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
to the question: what civil laws should be allowed to govern
modern society? The Framers have left us with a slightly pliable
rule with which each generation can determine what impact religion
may have on government and vice versa. Those who would attack
state actions as violative of the establishment clause should have the
burden of showing that the law is undesireable for society and that
there is some compelling reason for departing from our historical
roots. Merely calling it a violation of the establishment clause is
conclusory and circular.
Demographically, America is no longer a "christian nation" and
many of the "christian" laws which were passed during the country's
founding are now disregarded (for example Sunday closing laws,
blasphemy laws, adultery laws, abortion laws, pornography laws, etc.).
America has embarked on a journey with new navigators: social
utilitarianism, rationalism, and personal autonomy. On a strictly
rational level it is as violative of the establishment clause if ir-
religion 1' begins to be preferred over religion as when the govern-
ment promotes a more traditional religion. Both are philosophies
which aid people in directing their lives and in making important
personal decisions. Historically though, America was, and is, a
Christian nation; it should remain so. "[N]ot Christianity with an
established church, and tithes, and spiritual courts; but Christianity
with liberty of conscience to all men.""' If America does not
recognize and give proper deference to its heritage it faces a future
without the moral/spiritual support of Christianity."'2 "If Rationalism
wishes to govern the world without regard to the religious needs of
the soul, the French Revolution is there to teach us the consequen-
ces of such a blunder.
213
Lawrence F. Reilly
210. See supra notes 96-97 and accompany text.
211. Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. and Rawle 394, 400 (Pa. 1824). See also
supra note 201 and accompanying text.
212. Consider the ramifications presently facing us in having to justify laws in the following
areas on a purely social-utilitarian basis: obscenity/pornography, prostitution, monogamy,
usury, abortion, suicide, euthanasia.
213. F. SCHAEFFER, supra note 12, at 45 (quoting A. DURANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
50-51 (1968) (quoting Renan, 1866)). See also id., at 115.
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